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RECENT DECISIONS
his property is assessed he is estopped from denying the validity of
the assessment for benefit. It is the general rule that when the assess-
ment is void, the property owner is not estopped from denying its
validity even though he has accepted the benefits of the improvement.
Cases in New York are conflicting on this point, some cases holding
that the doctrine of estoppel will apply even where the assessment is
void,2 0 and others adhering to the general rule.
21
B. B.
EMINENT DOMAIN-WHAT CONSTITUTES PUBLIC UsE.-The
Commissioner of Parks, upon authorization of the Board of Estimate
and Apportionment, instituted this action to condemn certain prop-
erties adjacent to the Flushing Meadow Park to be used temporarily
as a parking space for the proposed New York World's Fair and to
be used thereafter as a park and playground. The owners of this land
oppose the action on the ground that it is a taking of private land for
private rather than public use and furthermore that there is no need
for this additional land. Held, application to vest title to the land in
the city, granted. The legislature's determination that land is neces-
sary for public use may not be questioned by the court. The court
may question whether the use is public or private in nature. Tempo-
rarily setting aside a portion of a public park to be used as a parking
space in connection with a fair and' later to be used as a park and
playground, is a public use. Matter of Flushing Meadow Park (Sup.
Ct. Queens), New York Law Journal, October 19, 1936.
The city of New York has the power to condemn private prop-
erty for a public purpose.1 The determination of the legislature as
to the necessity for such land is not reviewable by the court.2  The
" Owners of property who were specially assessed for an authorized street
improvement were estopped from raising the objection that the city had not
condemned the land, had not made awards to the owners and had not acquired
title to the land on which the improvement was made. The court held that the
owners have and enjoy the improvement and cannot justly claim to be relieved
from payment of the benefits assessed against such property. Boyton v. People,
159 Ill. 553, 42 N. E. 842 (1896) ; Holms v. Village etc., 121 Ill. 128, 13 N. E.
540 (1887) (remedy would be to sue for the awards that would have resulted
from a condemnation).
People v. Many, 89 Hun 138, 35 N. Y. Supp. 78 (1895).
' In re Sharpe, 56 N. Y. 257 (1874).
'CHARTER OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK § 970 (L. 1901, c. 466, amd. by L.
1913, c. 329).
'Matter of Fowler, 53 N. Y. 60 (1873); Matter of Church Street, 49
Barb. 455 (N. Y. 1867); Harris v. Thompson, 9 Barb. 350 (N. Y. 1850);
People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595 (1860) ; Matter of Cooper, 28 Hun 515 (N. Y.
1883) ; Matter of Peter Townsend, 39 N. Y. 171 (1868); Matter of Sacket
Street, 74 N. Y. 95 (1878); Matter of Boston Road, 142 App. Div. 726,
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court may impute only public motives to the legislature's acts of con-
demnation, thereby closing the door to an allegation that the land is
not to be used for the purpose stated.3 But the legislature's statement
that the land is for public purposes is not conclusive. 4 Whether or
not it is such a purpose is a question of law for the court5  Not only
must the land be for a public purpose but for such public purpose only
as to which the city has the power of condemnation.8 As to what
a public purpose is can not be exactly defined.7 The purpose may be
one of public benefit or of public use. The two terms are not syn-
onymous.8 The establishment of furnaces, mills, manufactures,
churches, hotels, and other similar enterprises are matters of public
concern and in the sense that they promote the public welfare they
are public benefits. 9 "But they lie without the domain of public uses
for which private ownership may be displaced by compulsory proceed-
ings." ' 0 "There must be a right on the part of the public or some
portion of it or some public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the
public, to use the property after it is condemned," 11 in order that
the power of eminent domain be exercisable. 12 The contemplated use
of a portion of a park for parking purposes falls within thisdefinition.18
Lands already acquired may later be used for purposes other than
127 N. Y. Supp. 637 (1st Dept. 1911); Matter of the City of New York, Ely
Ave., 217 N. Y. 45, 111 N. E. 266 (1916); Matter of Niagara Falls and W. R.
Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429 (1888).
'City of Buffalo v. Pratt, 131 N. Y. 293, 30 N. E. 233 (1892) ; McCabe v.
City of New York, 213 N. Y. 468, 107 N. E. 1049 (1915); Lahr v. Met. El.
Ry. Co., 104 N. Y. 268, 10 N. E. 528 (1887) ; Matter of New Street, 215 N. Y.
109, 109 N. E. 104 (1915).
'Matter of Townsend, 39 N. Y. 171 (1868) ; Matter of Deansville Cemetery
Ass'n, 66 N. Y. 569 (1876); Matter of Split Rock Cable Road Co., 128 N. Y.
408, 28 N. E. 506 (1891); Williams v. Hylan, 223 App. Div. 48, 227 N. Y.Supp. 392 (1st Dept. 1928); Williams v. Gattalin, 229 N. Y. 248, 128 N. E. 121
(1920).
'Queens Terminal Co. v. Schmuck, 147 App. Div. 502, 132 N. Y. Supp. 159(2d Dept. 1911) ; In re Application Union Ferry Co., 98 N. Y. 139, 153 (1885).
'Erie R. R. Co. v. Steward, 170 N. Y. 172, 63 N. E. 118 (1902); Matter
of S. I. Rapid Transit Co., 103 N. Y. 251, 257, 8 N. E. 548 (1886).
Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 26 Pac. 367 (1891) ; Tanner v. Treasury
Tunnel Min. & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 Pac. 464 (1906); Matter of
Niagara Falls & W. R. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429 (1888).
'Matter of Niagara Falls & W. R. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429 (1888).
'Ibid.
" Ibid.
n 54 A. L. R. 44; Re Deansville Cemetery Ass'n, 66 N. Y. 569 (1876) ; Re
Eureka Basin Warehouse & Mfg. Co., 96 N. Y. 42 (1884) ; Re Niagara Falls &
W. R. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429 (1888) ; Re New- York, 135 N. Y. 253,
31 N. E. 1043 (1892) ; Re Split Rock Cable Road Co., 128 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E.
506 (1891) ; Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N. Y. 249, 29 N. E. 246(1891); Economic Power & Construction Co. v. Buffalo, 195 N. Y. 286, 88
N. E. 389 (1909).
"I1bid.
" Blank v. Browne, 217 App. Div. 624, 216 N. Y. Supp. 664 (2d Dept.
1926).
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those intended at the time of condemnation. 14 Land may be con-
demned for future use.15 Its use at any time must not constitute an
alienation, nor an unlawful use of.public property.' 6 Its temporary
use, until that future time, as a parking space is not an alienation of
city property in violation of Section 71 of the Greater New York
Charter. 17 The definition of public use must be kept elastic in order
to keep pace with changing conditions; Is "resort must be had to
cases rather than definitions." 19 Matter of Flushing Meadow Park
stands as an additional case construing what is a public use.
L.J.
EVIDENCE-PROSECUTION FOR RECEIVING, CONCEALING AND
WITHHOLDING STOLEN PROPERTY UNDER SECTION 1308 OF THE
PENAL LAw.-Defendant, a dealer in second-hand automobiles, was
charged with violating the Penal Law 1 in having received, concealed
I Matter of Boston Road, 142 App. Div. 726, 127 N. Y. Supp. 637 (1st
Dept. 1911).
1Matter of S. I. Rapid Transit Co., 103 N. Y. 251, 8 N. E. 548 (1886).
Kahabka v. Schab, et al., 205 App. Div. 368, 371, 199 N. Y. Supp. 551(4th Dept. 1923), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 595, 142 N. E. 298 (1923); People ex rel.
Hoffeller v. Buck, 193 App. Div. 262, 184 N. Y. Supp. 210 (4th Dept. 1920),
aff'd, 230 N. Y. 608, 130 N. E. 913 (1920) ; Callanan v. Gillman, 107 N. Y. 360,
14 N. E. 264 (1887) ; Cohen v. Mayor, 113 N. Y. 532, 21 N. E. 700 (1889).
"'Gushee v. City of New York, 42 App. Div. 37, 58 N. Y. Supp. 967 (1st
Dept. 1899). At page 41, the court said, "It is proper to furnish * * * oppor-
tunities * * * for rest for themselves and their animals as may be required."
This Doctrine was later extended to include the advent of automobiles in Matter
of McCoy v. Apgar, 241 N. Y. 71, 150 N. E. 546 (1925) ; Blank v. Browne, 217
App. Div. 624, 216 N. Y. Supp. 664 (2d Dept. 1926).
1554 A. L. R. 7; Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 26 Pac. 376 (1891) ; Tanner
v. Treasury Tunnel Min. & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 Pac. 464 (1906). In
answering the question as to what is a public use Judge Cooley says, "That
can only be considered such when the government is supplying its own needs,
or is furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to public necessity which on
account of their peculiar character, and the difficulty, perhaps impossibility of
making provision for them otherwise, it is alike proper, useful and needful for
the public to provide." This Definition was cited with approval in Matter of
Niagara Falls & W. R. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429 (1888).
Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 26 Pac. 376 (1891).
1 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1308: "A person who buys or receives any property
knowing the same to have been stolen * * * or who conceals, withholds, or aids
in concealing or withholding any property, knowing the same to have been
stolen, * * * is guilty of a felony * * *. A person who being a dealer in or
collector of any merchandise or property, * * * fails to make reasonable inquiry
that the person selling or delivering any stolen or misappropriated property to
him has the legal right to do so, shall be presumed to have bought or received
such property knowing it to have been stolen or misappropriated." It is proved
in this case that the defendant made no inquiries whatever as to the 'legal
right to do so' of the person from whom he received the car. Under this
section he was, therefore; presumed to have received the Buick, knowing it to
have been stolen.
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